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HOk DOES PLATO SOLVE THE PARADOX OF IDQUIRÏ 
IK THE HERO?
Michael Morgan, Indiana University 
SAGP West, 1985
In this paper I sha 11 focus on a passage in Plato's 
dialogue, the heno, that has received wide ana serious attention 
of late. It is that stretch of the Heno (80d-
86c) that incorporates Meno's eristic puzzle, the doctrine of 
recollection, Socrates' interrogation of Meno's slave-boy, and 
the sequel to that interrogation. I shall try to show that this 
text is transitional and doubly so, for, on the one hand, within 
the context of the heno it marks the transition between the 
earlier elenehoi concerning the nature of arete and the 
employment of the method of hypothesis concerning whether arete 
is teachable and, on the other, within the early and middle 
dialogues as a whole it marks the transition between largely 
elenctic, Socratic inquiries and Platonic discussions with 
greater epistemological and metaphysical weight. This latter 
claim is controversial in a way that the earlier one, about the 
text's transitional role in the dialogue, is not, but the claim 
is defensible in a way that I shall try to demonstrate in 
subsequent sections of this paper.
THE PARADOX Ûi IK t, UIR Y
At Heno 80d a frustrated heno tries to stall his 
conversation with Socrates by setting up a roadblock. If you do 
not know something, he asks, how can one search for it? lor if 
you don't know it, either you can't set it up as the object of 
your search or, even if one could, you wouldn't know that what 
you found is what you were looking for. Socrates acknowledges 
the gambit as a familiar one, though his own reformulation of the 
puzzle differs from Reno's version in an important way. To Meno, 
the puzzle about inquiry or searching is a dilemma about how, 
given an original ignorance, one can either begin or conclude a 
search. To Socrates, the puzzle is a dilemma about initiating 
such a search; to begin with knowledge of the object sought makes 
searching for it unnecessary (and perhaps impossible) and to 
begin without knowledge of it makes searching impossible to 
iniate. So for Heno the problem concerns the unacceptable 
consequences of initial ignorance; for Socrates it concerns, more 
radically, the impasse that results from either initial knowing 
or initial ignorance. Since it is Socrates' version that is 
addressed in the text that follows, we shall concern ourselves 
with it alone.
Many commentators, among them Grube, Burnet, Shorey, Ritter, 
and Taylor, treat the puzzle lightly as comic relief or a mere 
interlude, the dramatic setting into which the doctrine of 
recollection is introduced but itself of no serious import. But 
other commentators, including Cornford, Bluck, Phillips, 
Moravcsik, Irwin, White, and Allen, agree that the puzzle is
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Iimportant in itself, although they are not always sensitive to 
the differences between Reno's version and Socrates' restatement.
The issue about the puzzle's seriousness is not a minor one. 
Socrates recalls the doctrine of recollection because he is 
seeking a solution to the current paradox. If the paradox is a 
dramatic interlude with no real philosophical role to play, then 
one must look elsewhere for the genuine difficulties which the 
doctrine of recollection is intended to address. On the other 
hand, if the paradox is a serious one and the real reason for 
introducing the doctrine of recollection, then what that doctrine 
is and how it should be understood will depend upon how it solves 
the paradox. And in so far as the doctrine has implications for 
Plato's epistemology and the stage it has reached by the time the 
heηo was written, the paradox begins tc take on greater 
significance still.
It is both plausible that Plato intended the paradox cf 
inquiry as a serious puzzle and likely that he did so. lirst, 
this would net be the only case where an eristic puzzle played a 
serious philosophical role for Plato. While the tuthyderous is a 
collection cf sophistical puzzles and paradoxes that are not 
typically addressed in that dialogue as serious philosophical 
problems, other dialogues show Plate wrestling with sophistical 
puzzles with great concern and with impressive results. The 
paradoxes about contradiction and relativism in the Cratylus come 
to mind, as do the puzzles about aitiai in the Phaedo and the 
paradox of phi 1dsophica1 rule in the Repub 1ic. hot all of these, 
of course, can be confirmed as conventional eristic tropes, but 
some surely can be. Most impressive of all in this genre are the 
puzzles about false belief and false speech that generate such 
rich results in the Cra ty1 us. Thesete tus, and Sophist. This last 
case by itself would stand as dramatic evidence that a 
commonplace eristic puzzle could take on grand importance for 
Plato and stimulate his own philosophical inquiries in very 
significant ways.
Secondly, the current puzzle, because cf its specific 
content, does have serious implications for Plato and his 
Socratic inheritance. Socrates' reformulation, is an attempt tc 
argue that inquiry is impossible. but if that were true, the 
result would be some form of skepticism, relativism, or some 
whimsical, unsystematic acquisition of moral knowledge. These 
would not be welcome alternatives to Socrates or Plato and hence 
the challenge of the puzzle would not have teen viewed as a 
facile one. lurthermore, in so far as moral knowledge is 
necessary for human excellence and thereby for human well-being, 
the puzzle is of momentous importance. Tor Socratic dialectic is 
both a check on whether one has such moral knowledge and a method 
for acquiring it. But, if true, the paradox destroys the 
possibility of Socratic inquiry and thereby the possibility of 
either confirming one's moral knowledge or acquiring it.
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THE DOCTRINE Of RECOLLECTION AND THE SOLUTION TO THE PARADOX
At 86c Socrates says, "...we are agreed that it is right to 
inquire into something that one does not know." This statement 
shows that somewhere between 81a and 86c the paradox had been 
solved. But what is the solution, and how does it work?
Those who read Guthrie, Cornford, Allen, and Bluck, among 
others, will find there what we might call the "traditional 
view." According to this view, the paradox is a dilemma about 
one's epistemic resources at the outset of inquiry and the role 
those resources play at the inquiry's conclusion. The 
alternatives that the dilemma proposes are beginning with 
(1)total, explicit knowledge or with (2)absolute ignorance. The 
doctrine of recollection provides the solution with its proposal 
that all inquiry begins with something intermediate between 
(1) and (2): latent, unconscious, or implicit knowledge. When
these commentators speak of "total knowledge," they seem to have 
in mind "self-consciously clear" or "conscious" knowledge. They 
speak of implicit knowledge being aroused or made explicit —  
presumably by a process akin to the questioning that Keno's 
slave-boy undergoes.
The traditional view, as we have it, is flawed by 
imprecision, weak or nonexistent argument, and faulty 
assumptions. No attempt is made to clarify whether (1) and (2) 
concern the object of knowledge or the act of knowing in some 
occurrent sense, to clarify, that is, what exactly the paradox is 
about and what a solution ought to provide. No attempt is made 
to examine the text carefully and systematically in order to 
defend the accuracy of the proposal. It is assumed rather than 
argued that Plato means explicit knowledge or complete ignorance, 
that the slave-boy interrogation is evidence for the doctrine of 
recollection and not an illustration of it, that learning is 
intended by Plato to be identical with and not similar to 
recollection, and that the kind of knowledge at issue is 
exclusively a priori. And there is tendency, not always made 
explicit, to read the Phaedo account of recollection uncritically 
back into the Meno. These are substantial difficulties and while 
they do not of course refute the traditional conclusion, they do 
weaken the case for it.
Recent treatments, notably those of Koravcsik, White, and 
the brief one by Irwin, remedy many of these deficiencies. They 
involve penetrating, subtle, and thorough argument and 
scholarship. Right or wrong, they provide careful examination of 
what the paradox is and hence what it would take to solve it and 
scrupulous consideration of the text. These discussions are an 
excellent foundation for further work.
Rather than simply survey these accounts, let me try to 
identify their most significant common features and differences. 
First, they agree that the paradox and hence the doctrine of 
recollection are not about all kinds of inquiry and learning. 
Rather they concern only that type of inquiry that is a
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searching, and they are about that kind of learning that is the 
result of an inquiry directed to a goal that is fixed in some way 
in advance. Both Moravcsik and White emphasize this feature. We 
might call this "purposive learning," but it is purposive 
learning with the added condition that the learner must either 
initiate the learning him or her self or at least have in some 
way appropriated the task or goal of the learning for himself.
In seme sense, then, the paradox is about knowing what one is 
looking for and yet not knowing it yet.
Secondly, Moravcsik, following tradition and Gregory Vlastos 
in a paper on this subject, believes that the paradox and the 
doctrine of recollection are solely concerned with a priori 
knowledge and its acquisition via inquiry. This brings the heno 
into line with the Phaedo and the later Platonic employment of 
the doctrine of recollection; it makes the Meno the initial 
Platonic statement on an issue of perennial philosophical 
interest. White and Irwin, however, believe that the text of the 
Meno is at best indecisive on this restriction and that while the 
particular context for the paradox and what follows is 
definitional inquiry, the paradox and doctrine as presented are 
neutral with respect to their object. Part of their reason for 
saying this is that neither the dialogue with the slave-boy nor 
the notion of an aitias 1ogismos, introduced later as the 
mechanism whereby true belief is converted into knowledge, seem 
to require £ priori objects.
Ihirdly, Moravcsik takes recollection to be a metaphor for 
learning via inquiry. For him, the solution to the paradox is 
that learning works like remembering. In recall, we apprehend an 
image, concept, etc. now, after having once apprehended at some 
earlier time and since forgotten it. Some feature of this 
activity must account for why it is recall, however, and not 
simply two distinct apprehensions of the same thing. This 
feature he calls a mental or physical factor in the rememberer 
that is causally related to both the original apprehension and 
the recall. When a new stimulus is experienced, it triggers a 
recollection because of this "entitative factor" in the 
rememberer. In learning, a question triggers an analogous factor 
that issues in understanding and a response. Hence, for 
Moravcsik the paradox is solved by grabbing both horns of the 
dilemma: the truths, i.e., sets of concepts cr beliefs, are in
us, and learning serves to bring them to consciousness. So, in a 
sense, at the outset of inquiry, the learner does know the 
answer, and in a sense he or she does not. by treating learning 
as similar to recall, then, Moravcsik has given us a 
sophisticated version of the traditional view in which learning a 
priori truths is like remembering and begins with implicit but 
not explicit knowledge of those truths.
Fourthly, for White and Irwin, the paradox is about 
recognition, and because it is about recognition, it is also 
about reference and identity of reference. How does one 
recognize a successful outcome of an inquiry already framed? One 
cannot recognize it without in some sense already having known
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it. Self-initiated inquiry and recognition require knowledge of 
a specification or description that directs the search from the 
outset. The paradox is this: without knowledge of such a
specification, inquiry is impossible, but with such knowledge one 
already knows what is being sought. White describes a case of 
searching for a pair of gloves with a specification already in 
hand and compares it to searching for a Form with a definition in 
hand. The analogue shows how Plato might have thought that 
having the specification looks like already having the goal. For 
White, then, the paradox is very precisely about the epistemic 
conditions necessary for getting a search or inquiry underway. 
How, he asks, can one have a specification of the object of the 
search without already knowing that object?
The traditional solution, and Moravcsik's as well, has 
Socrates grab both horns of the dilemma. White disagrees. Plato 
is wrong, he says, to think that with a specification of the 
object sought we already have knowledge it. The specification 
does not refer to the precise object sought but rather to the 
sort of thing; it applies to the office and not the office­
holder, to the position and not the candidate. In short, the 
second horn of the dilemma is false, and to see this would solve 
the paradox by dissolving it.
According to White, however, Plato chooses another route.
He solves the paradox by denying one horn of the dilemma -- that 
we do know in a sense, for inquiry is recollection. In the case 
of inquiry, specification counts as knowledge of the outcome, but 
in the case of a directed recollection, specification does not 
count as such knowledge.
Fifthly, Irwin agrees with White but only up to a point. 
Inquiry is directed search, and the paradox does say that with 
total ignorance or total, complete knowledge such a search is 
impossible or unnecessary. Hut whereas White has Plato reject 
one horn of the dilemma as false, Irwin has him nose between the 
two. While ignorance makes inquiry impossible and knowledge 
makes it unnecessary, true belief redeems inquiry and makes it 
possible. What we need to initiate inquiry are enough true 
beliefs about x to fix the reference cf the term "x" so that when 
the inquiry is completed, we can see that we are still referring 
to the same thing. What disarms the paradox is the explicit 
distinction between knowledge and true belief made at S7e-S6b and 
the implicit employment of that distinction earlier in the 
dialogue with the slave-boy.
One important feature of Irwin's account is that Plato's 
answer to the paradox does not come in the doctrine of 
recollection. It comes first in the discussion with the slave- 
boy where the boy answers with true beliefs that are his own. 
These beliefs involve specifications that are not knowledge. The 
recollection thesis is not Plato's solution to the paradox. It 
is one explanation -- and not necessarily the best one —  of how 
the boy can answer the way that he does, with these true beliefs, 
but the real solution to the paradox comes in that answering,
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with what Irwin calls "quasi-recollection," and with those 
beliefs. In short, the paradox is solved by a fact and not by a 
theory, and that fact is belief and the way in which it can be 
employed to get inquiry started and carry it through to its 
completion.
t a c a TO THE MEtiO
A careful reading of the Meno, especially that passage 
(8i)b8-8t>b4) in which Plato describes what had taken, place in the 
interrogation of the slave-boy and draws inferences from that 
description, gives us a view of the text that is indebted to 
these interpretations but not wholly like any one of them.
Let us do two things. First, let us consider where 
Moravcsik, White, ejt a_l. are correct and where the text shows 
them to be wrong. Secondly, we should look at the passage just 
mentioned to assess what it contributes to our understanding how 
Plato in fact does solve the paradox.
iirst. White, Moravcsik, and Irwin are surely right to 
restrict the paradox to purposive inquiry or directed search. 
Socrates' reformulation of the dilemma and his own dialectical 
interests encourage this restriction, as does the interrogation 
of the slave-boy, which is simply a model of a full Socratic 
elenchos. This, however, is not only the most important 
restriction on the type of learning in question; it is also the 
only restriction. Contra Vlastos and Moravcsik, the evidence 
that the paradox and the doctrine are solely concerning with the 
learning of a priori truths is simply not secure. White and 
Irwin are right in this regard. Wot only is it doubtful that 
Plato would have treated geometrical inquiries as a priori; the 
formulation of the doctrine of recollection (81c) and the later 
discussion about true beliefs and knowledge of the road to 
Larissa show that Plato did not in the h e η o yet have in mind what 
would later come to be treated as a distinction between empirical 
and a_ priori truths. The fact that something of this order is 
already present in Parmenides' poem does not by itself entail 
that Plato, at this point in his career, had appropriated it, nor 
does the further fact that by the time he had written the Phaedo 
he had done so. To assume so is to disregard the possibility cf 
serious intellectual development on Plato's part.
Secondly, the absence of the restriction to a priori 
knowledge in the heno is matched by but perhaps not related to 
the absence of the separated forms of Plato's middle dialogues, 
and the separated forms are certainly missing from the heno. It 
is not decisive of course that the nomenclature for the torms is 
not present in the Keno. What is decisive are the facts that the 
objects of belief and knowledge can be the same and that they are 
spoken of as iji the soul. What are recalled as the result of 
directed inquiry, contra V lastos, White, e_t a^ ., are truths, 
i.e., true accounts that answer what-is-x questions, theorems, 
and similar statements. We shall have more to say about these
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truths, their role and nature. For the moment, it is sufficient 
to notice that later Plato will indeed allude to the Meno account 
of recollection -- in the Phaedo and Republic especially -- in 
ways that locate Forms in it. But without decisive evidence in 
favor of such an interpretation, we should be reluctant to take 
Plato's word, as it were; he would surely not be the last 
philosopher to read his more developed views into his own earlier 
writings. It is in the Phaedo and not earlier that the doctrine 
of learning as recollection, adopted previously, is adjusted to 
suit the requirements of a newly developed metaphysical view and 
specifically the existence of the Forms.
Thirdly, the burden Irwin places on belief is too great for 
it to bear. In the heno, the difference between believing and 
knowing is a difference in our activity of answering questions 
correctly when called upon to do so and in general of affirming the 
truth of a statement when such affirmation is called for. True 
believing and knowledge are both directed to truths; they differ 
because the one who merely believes what is true has not yet 
worked out fully for himself why the truth is true and so will 
not reliably affirm that truth when the situation calls upon him 
to do so. The result of learning is not merely true believing, 
although even at that stage the learner does have the truth in 
mind. Real learning, as Plato explicitly says, is completed only 
when the truth is so firmly fixed in the learner's mind that he 
will always, reliably affirm it when the situation calls for its 
affirmation. Furthermore, if belief solves the paradox, then why 
does Socrates continue with his description cum argument after 
85b8-c8? If Irwin is right, the doctrine of recollection is 
artistic trapping and not serious philosophy, for, as he says, 
the paradox is solved by the phenomenon of quasi-recollection; 
the doctrine of recollection is merely one possible explanation 
of how that quasi-recollection takes place. Irwin does not say, 
in addition, that as a religious explanation it is fanciful and 
not to be taken seriously, but he might very well have thought 
it.
Fourthly, while Irwin is wrong about the role of belief in 
Plato's solution to the paradox, he is more right than White is 
about Plato's general strategy. Plato solves the dilemma not by 
grabbing one horn and rejecting the other but rather by either 
grasping both or nosing between them. This is a matter of 
Socratic and Platonic style. White's interpretation gives us a 
different Plato and one whose solution is rather inexplicable and 
arbitrary. For White cannot really explain why Plato would have 
thought that having a prior specification is not knowledge in the 
case of recollection whereas it _is knowledge in the case of 
inquiry. We are not really shown why Plato should have taken 
this to be a solution at all. White's analysis depends on the 
supposition thet Plato would have thought that having a 
specification in the case of directed recollection would not 
count as knowledge. But the crucial kind of recollection, for 
Plato, is not directed or purposive. Even if to learn is to 
recall, it is hardly the case that trying to learn is trying to 
recall.
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Finally, Koravcsik is mistaken to think that learning is 
only like recollection. At 65c-d Plato moves from his account 
that the be liéis were in the boy to the conclusion that knowledge 
is in him -- which must mean that the truths, i.e., the objects 
of believing and knowing are in him -- and then to the further 
conclusion that this is reco1 lection. It is, he says, recovering 
again knowledge that is already in one's soul. Koravcsik may be 
right that analyses of recall and learning reveal that they can 
be interpreta ted as having an analogous structure. but in the 
Meno Plato gives no indication that he has that analogous 
structure in mind. In fact, what he does indicate is that 
directed inquiry is possible not because it is like recall but 
because it is in fact a case of reca 11 (b¿¡c9-d8). If you have 
something in your ken, was it possible for you to look for it 
before you had it without already having it? Only, Plato says, 
if having it now is having it once again or calling it to mind 
once again and if the search began with that something already in 
your mind but not yet in your ken.
All of these recent interpretations of the doctrine of 
recollection and how it is intended to solve the paradox of 
inquiry rest on the same foundation. They all agree that the 
doctrine must be about the epistemological conditions necessary 
for inquiry and directed learning. This is most vividly present 
in White and Irwin where the issue is taken to be one of 
reference and identity of reference and hence how the learner's 
referential capacities in terms of certain specifications at the 
outset of inquiry are related to his referential successes at the 
end. Eut if, in a sense, Plato is interested in reference, in 
the learner's thinking of something, he is interested not in its 
epistemological conditions but rather in its metaphysical ones.
He is concerned, that is, about the object of reference and not 
how the referring gets done. For this mental referring, for 
Plato, is like any kind of grasping; without an object, it is 
just a matter of waving the hand. But if at the outset of 
inquiry, one has the object in one's grasp, then it is 
unnecessary and perhaps even impossible to look for it. And if 
not, then where does it come from. In Socrates' reformulation of 
the paradox, he says of the inquirer that if "he does not know, 
[then] he does not even know what he is to look for." This means 
that if he does have what is to be grasped, then how is he to 
grasp it -- for all this mental grasping goes on in the soul.
One of the keys that unlocks the paradox of inquiry and the 
doctrine of recollection is the realization that for Plato the 
objects of true believing and knowing are truths. These truths 
he detaches from the world and places in the soul, and believing 
and knowing are grasping truths in one's soul. Inquiry or 
learning is a matter of searching for these truths, and the paradox 
of inquiry, to Plato, is a puzzle about how directed searching 
can succeed. The doctrine of recollection is the doctrine that 
having a truth does not imply grasping or knowing it but that 
knowing or grasping it implies and indeed requires having it. 
Beliefs do not solve the paradox, for true ones are already a
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matter of grasping, though tentatively, truths whereas false ones 
are no better than ignorance. Nor do sufficiently accurate 
specifications do the job, for the issue is not what directions 
one takes to getting the grasping or pointing started but rather 
what is there to be grasped or pointed at. The only thing that 
will solve the paradox is to show that the truths that are the 
objects of true believing and knowing are ^n the soul always, 
which is just what Plato shows at 85d-86b. The best Platonic 
image of how the doctrine of recollection is intended to solve 
the paradox of inquiry comes from Plate himself -- the image of 
birds in the aviary of the soul and the distinction between 
having and holding. But the kinship between the Meno and the 
Theaetetus on this as on other issues has not gone unnoticed by 
other commentators, nor is it surprising. tor the Theaetetus is 
about what knowledge is, which on the Meno's own principles is a 
question prior to the question how it is got. And the aviary is 
proposed as an answer to the problem of how false belief is 
possible, an answer offered perhaps because it had already served 
with some satisfaction to explain how true belief and inquiry 
are possible.
The paradox of inquiry is solved by recognizing that the 
truths apprehended and affirmed at the culmination of inquiry are 
always in the soul, always available as objects of our mental 
grasp.But this boldly metaphysical solution may seem gratuitous. 
Why require Plato to have introduced an otherwise unattested 
metaphysical entity when the Forms are at hand? Indeed, what is 
this thing that he calls "the truth of things (.that] is always in 
the soul?" tahat is the structure of these truths? What is their 
nature?
A short answer to these queries would be that Plato simply 
does not explore or illuminate the ontological status of these 
truths or their structure. They are introduced to solve a 
serious epistemological puzzle and are derived by inference from 
the doctrine of inquiry and learning as recollection, a doctrine 
appropriated from Orphic lore and tooled to Plato's purposes.
But this is the short answer; more can be said, although it 
is conjectural and speculative. As Plato begins to explore 
seriously epistemological matters concerning believing, knowing, 
their relations and objects, equipped as he is with a Socratic 
view of the soul as the seat of personality, character, and 
intellect, he comes to see that the objects of knowing and 
believing, permanent and stable truths, cannot be in the world. 
Eventually he will dictate the terms of these objects' status; 
they will be ungenerated, imperishable, immutable, pure, and so 
on, all attributes appropriate to the certainty of knowledge. In 
the Meno, however, he has not yet reached that momentous 
metaphysical discovery. Here Plato is groping for a solution to 
a precise puzzle and, if only temporarily, locates truth not in a 
Platonic heaven but rather in the soul, within the soul's easy 
reach. Later, in the Theaetetus and Sophist, he will say that a 
logos is the external expression of a doxa, and in the Parmenides 
he will propose and then dispose of the suggestion that Forms are
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thoughts (noemata) in the soul. Perhaps, then, the Meno's truths 
are internal sentences or thoughts -- examples surely include 
true theorems of geometry and true answers to what-is-x questions 
-- although Plato gives no helpful clues or advice concerning 
their structure. All of this notwithstanding, the truths in the 
soul, the objects of true believing and knowing in the Meno, are 
soon abandoned in favor of the separated forms, only to resurface 
in different guises throughout the course of Western philosophy.
In the passage immediately following the interrogation of 
Meno's slave-boy (85b8-86b4), Plato indicates clearly that this 
is how he understands what he has written. If we look first at 
&5b8-c8, we see that in this passage Plato has incorporated an 
important transition, from a seemingly harmless description of 
the slave-boy's behavior -- the beliefs are "his own" —  to a 
potentially serious epistemological and possibly metaphysical 
claim -- they are "in him" (85c4)· And what "in him" must mean 
at this stage of the dialogue is "not in another," e.g.,not in 
Socrates. The boy's beliefs, that is, are believings about 
things in him and not about things in another. Later Plato 
writes that among the beliefs in the boy are true ones (85c6-7), 
and that if this is so (86a6-7), then what is in him is hë 
a letheia ton onton. "In him" is explicitly said to mean "in the 
soul" [8bb1-257 and so what Meno agrees to ultimately is that the 
objects of the boy's believing are truths in his soul.
At 85c9-d8 Plato has Socrates use this conclusion, that the 
objects of believing are in the soul, to generate the conclusion 
that the boy's "recovering knowledge that is in him [is] 
recollecting" (85d?). Meno casually accepts the proposal that 
beliefs, newly aroused like a dream, can be converted into 
knowledge, for he finds no difficulty in agreeing that once a 
truth is in the mind, then the transition from believing it to 
knowing it is not insurmountable. Hence, the boy can be said to 
"recover the knowledge out of himself" (85d3-4)» where 
"knowledge" clearly refers to the object of the knowing, the 
truth about the diagonal on the given square. heno is so casual 
about accepting the word "recover" that its meaning must be the 
most obvious. Prior to the boy's being asked a question, a given 
truth is in his soul but unattended to. When the question is 
asked, the boy responds by assenting to the truth, first as a 
belief, later as knowledge. And he does so by grasping again 
what he already had but only in an unapprehended fashion, and 
such a grasping again is an act of recovery. This is Socrates' 
line of reasonings from belief to knowledge to recovery to 
recollection, with his attention always on the truths that are 
the objects of all four.
The final section of this sequel to the slave-boy discussion 
(65d9-86b5) is exceedingly difficult. In his final speech 
Socrates recites the conclusions associated with the doctrine of 
recollection—  that the soul is immortal, that inquiry is 
recollection, and that one ought to be bold and confident in 
undertaking inquiry into what one does not presently know (8bb1-
10
4). But while these are the results of this entire stretch of 
the dialogue, it is far from clear how they are got.
There is a very precise argument developed in this passage. 
This is the argument:
(1) Recollection is the recovery of truths which one once 
knew but which one does not currently apprehend.
(2) These truths either (a) were grasped or seized at a 
particular time or (b) were always in one *s possession.
(C) The truth of things is always in our soul.
The conclusion is given in the protasis of a conditional at bbbl- 
2. In interpreting this argument there are two possibilities, 
that (C) is the same as (b) or that (c) follows whether (a) or 
(b) is true. A careful reading of the intermediate dialogue 
shows, I think, that the latter alternative, though more 
difficult to see, is indeed the correct one.
If we were to assume that (C) is the same as (2b), then the 
most natural way to arrive at (C) from (1) and (2) would be to 
show that (2a) is false. Unfortunately, at 85d12-86a10 Socrates 
does net do this. The argument of this intervening stretch of 
dialogue is this:
(j>) If one always had the truths ( = 2b), then one would also 
always be a knower.
(4) If one grasped the truths at a particular time (=2a), 
that time was when one was not a human being.
(i>) Some true beliefs are in the boy during the time when 
he is a human being and during the time he is not a 
human being.
(6) tor all time, the soul is or is not a human being.
(7) Therefore, the boy's soul has truths for all time
(=2b ).
The upshot of this line of reasoning, then, is that the boy 
recalls truths which he once learned only if he always has them. 
The truths are iri his soul for all time, always. It seems to be 
Socrates' strategy to show that if learning is recollection, then 
the recollected truths are always in the soul. There is no 
alternative.
This argument helps us to see what Plato has in mind as the 
solution to the paradox of inquiry. Consider again step (3): 
what does it mean to say that "he would also be a knower?" we 
have argued that Irwin is wrong about the solution to the 
paradox. hhile it may be plausible to think that the solution 
comes at 65cb-7 with so-called quasi-recollection, this is not 
Plato's solution. but if belief does not make inquiry possible, 
what does? Öbd12 may be the core of the answer to that question. 
Inquiry is possible only if the boy can recall truths already 
within him. But he can do this only if he always possessed those 
truths. The argument we are currently examining shows this to be 
the only condition for such recollection; one cannot recall 
something that is not in one's own mind but rather in another's, 
from the fact that the boy has always possessed these truths, we 
can infer that in a sense "he is also always a knower." But this 
disarms the paradox; inquiry is not unnecessary even when one
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knows. Indeed, such knowledge is a necessary condition for the 
possibility of such inquiry, even though the boy, at the same 
time, is not a knower in the sense that he knows the truths and 
knows that he knows them. There is here, as it were, no act of 
knowing at all, only once-having-known and possession. This, I 
think, is the only kind of knowing that the word 
(85d12) can refer to. '
In this examination of 8i>b8-86t4 we have shown that Plato 
first describes the slave-boy's behavior in such a way that it 
can be said to be a case of recollection and then argues that 
what is recalled, the truths first believed and eventually known, 
are always in the soul to be recalled. Plato is concerned about 
getting inquiry started only in so far as he believes that 
without the truths present in the inquirer's soul it can neither 
start nor succeed. It is in this sense that his interest in 
inquiry is metaphysical and net epistemological; Plato's problem 
about reference is the referrent and not the referring. Directed 
inquiry is possible only in so far as that referrent is always in 
the soul and coming to know it is a matter of recollection.
In some ways the solution 1 have developed rennovates the 
traditional view of how Plato solves the eristic puzzle, but it 
does so, 1 hope, with greater attention to the details of the 
text and the course of Plato's reasoning that are carefully 
examined by more recent commentators. but it has an advantage 
over the latter whose interpretations require of Plato a more 
nuanced interest in language and epistemology than the Meno by 
itself warrants. My interpretation does not require Plato to 
have distinguished tetween empirical and a priori truths, nor 
does it thrust the burden of the solution to belief rather than 
knowledge. It does not treat the doctrine of recollection as an 
unnecessary appendage nor as a metaphor but instead sees it as 
the precise vehicle for identifying these truths whose ongoing 
presence in the soul ultimately solves the paradox. And finally 
it takes seriously the discussion following the slave-boy 
dialogue, at &5b8-86b4, in which important conclusions are drawn 
from that dialogue and from the doctrine of learning as 
recollection. lo my mind, the emergence of Platonic genius is in 
large part the emergence of Plato's metaphysical thinking. On 
the interpretation that I have offered the Meno is a crucial 
stage in this process, a fact which will, among other things, I 
hope, recommend it.
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